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1 Introduction
The relationship between schooling and earnings is one of the most frequently studied in
empirical economics. A large number of these studies build upon versions of the earnings
equation proposed by Mincer (1974). A key parameter in the Mincer earnings equation
is the coeﬃcient associated with years of schooling. This coeﬃcient is meant to capture
the diﬀerences is earnings caused by diﬀerences in schooling. However, to give a causal
interpretation of the parameters of the earnings equation, one must take into account that
the independent variable “years of schooling” is endogenous because it is the outcome of
a choice variable: level of schooling. The endogeneity problem is related to the fact that
the researcher does not observe all factors that aﬀect the schooling choice. For example,
if some of these unobservable factors are correlated with unobservables in the earnings
equation, OLS will produce biased estimates of the returns to schooling (selection bias).
Traditionally, selection bias is assumed to arise because of correlation between length
of schooling and the additive error term in the earnings equation. If such correlation
exists and is positive, it implies that people with high earnings capacity (irrespective
of level of schooling) would systematically choose a higher schooling level than people
with low earnings capacity. Various econometric methods have been developed to deal
with this problem, see Griliches (1977) for an overview. In several more recent studies,
the coeﬃcient associated with years of schooling is allowed to be individual specific and
represented by a random variable in the model. The motivation for this extension is to
accommodate heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, that is implied by for example
the theoretical model of Willis and Rosen (1979). The random coeﬃcient may also be
correlated with the schooling variable and the additive error term in the earnings equation.
To deal with this type of endogeneity, two stage control function approaches have often
been applied (Heckman, 1979). This approach was introduced in a returns to schooling
framework by Garen (1984). There is also a substantial literature on how to interpret
instrumental variable estimates in the case of heterogeneity in returns to schooling. See for
example Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) and Woodridge
(2002). Card (2001) gives an overview of more recent approaches to estimating returns
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to schooling in the presence of individual heterogeneity.
The contribution of this paper is to develop a full information maximum likelihood
method for the estimation of the parameters of earnings- and schooling decision rela-
tions, when we allow for two types of self-selection into schooling: selection by ”absolute
advantage” (correlation between schooling and the additive error term in the earnings
equation) and selection by ”comparative advantage” (correlation between schooling and
the random coeﬃcients associated with the returns to schooling and experience). In our
framework, the decision model for the length of schooling is assumed to be an ordered
probit model, whereas the formulation of the earnings equation allows for (generalized)
Box-Cox or spline transformations of schooling and experience. A Box-Cox transforma-
tion of the dependent variable (earnings) is also allowed for. Under the assumption that
the unobserved random components of the model are multinormally distributed, we show
that the joint probability distribution for the chosen length of schooling and earnings can
be expressed on a closed form that is tractable for empirical analysis.
Compared to the two-stage approach, our maximum likelihood method oﬀers several
advantages: First, since estimation is carried out in one stage, we do not have to worry
about biased estimates of the standard errors. Such biases may arise because of imputation
of parameters estimated in the first first-stage and because, conditional on the individual’s
choice, the error term is heteroskedastic. Second, since our approach is based on the
maximum likelihood method it allows us to deal with non-linear transformations of both
earnings, schooling and experience that may contain unknown parameters (such as in Box-
Cox transformations). Third, our approach makes it easy to test interesting hypotheses
by means of the likelihood ratio test, whereas in the two-stage method exact testing will
be cumbersome. Finally, we are able to obtain expressions for the distributions of many
random variables of interest, such as the conditional distribution of earnings given the
chosen level of schooling. This is useful for assessing various kinds of treatment eﬀects.
A key issue in the recent literature on returns to schooling (and more generally in
the program evaluation literature), is the search for valid exclusion restrictions (exoge-
nous variation in the level of schooling) with the purpose of identifying key structural
parameters associated with the returns to schooling. We emphasize that also within our
framework interpretation of the results depends on the exclusion restrictions, although
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such restrictions are not formally needed to obtain identification.
In an application of our method on Norwegian data, it is confirmed that selection
eﬀects due to unobservables are important when analyzing the returns to schooling. We
find a significant positive correlation between the error term of the schooling choice equa-
tion and returns to schooling, and a significant negative correlation between the error
term of the schooling choice equation and the additive error tem of the earnings equa-
tion. Moreover, our study shows, similar to Heckman and Polachek (1974), that for all
practical purposes the logarithm of earnings fits the data best (within the class of Box-
Cox transformations). Regarding the transformation of the independent variables, we find
that piecewise linear functions of “length of schooling” and of “experience” give better fit
and also substatially diﬀerent results than generalized Box-Cox transformations (Box-Cox
transformations with arbitrary translations). In particular, we find that the returns to
schooling drops markedly after 14 years of schooling. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2 we present the modeling framework and derive several results
that enable us to carry out empirical inferences. In Section 3 we present the empirical
application, while Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The modelling framework
In this section we specify the modelling framework for estimating the earnings equation
and the choice of level of schooling. First consider the relation determining the length
of schooling. Let X∗ be a latent index that represents the desired level of schooling on
a continuous scale. The observed level of education, J , is a categorical variable with M
possible categories: J ∈ {1, 2, ..,M}. It is related to X∗ through the relation
J = j iﬀ µj−1 < X
∗ < µj , j = 1, ...,M , (1)
where X∗ represents the desired level of schooling and {µj} are unknown threshold values,
except for µ0 = −∞ and µM = ∞. The variable J represents the choice of level of
schooling as constrained by the institutional schooling system, whereas X∗ represents the
individual’s preferences with regard to the level of schooling on a continuous scale. The
threshold values {µj} determine the level of schooling in the institutional schooling system
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that corresponds to X∗. Furthermore, we assume that
X∗ = Z1γ1 + ε1, (2)
where Z1 is a row-vector of exogenous variables aﬀecting individual’s choice of school-
ing (typically family background variables describing the situation prior to the choice of
schooling), ε1 is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance
and γ1 is a fixed, unknown coeﬃcient vector. Thus, (1)-(2) specifies a standard ordered
probit model for the discrete choice variable J .
Consider next the earnings equation. Let XJ1 (α1) be a transformation of years of
schooling and XJ2 (α2) a transformation of labor market experience. The transformations
XJ1 (α1) and XJ2 (α2) depend on possibly unknown parameters, α1 and α2, respectively.
Each transformation may be a Box-Cox, polynomial, or spline function. The superscript J
is used to make explicit that both years of schooling and experience depend on the choice
variable, J . For example, for a given age, the maximum level of experience is lower the
higher the level of schooling. How XJ1 (α1) depends on J is determined by the insitutional
schooling system and can be taken as exogenous: we assume that, conditional on J , the
distribution of XJr (αr) is independent of ε1 as well as the random terms in the earnings
relation.
The most general form of our earnings equation is given by
(Y ω − 1)/ω = XJ(α)(β + η) + Z2γ2 + ε2, (3)
where ω is an unknown parameter to be estimated, XJ(α) = (XJ1 (α1),XJ2 (α2)), η =
(η1, η2) is a zero mean random coeﬃcient vector, β = (β1,β2) is the corresponding fixed
coeﬃcient vector, Z2 is a vector of exogenous variables which—in addition to variables from
Z1—also may contain other variables aﬀecting earnings. γ2 is the corresponding vector of
regression coeﬃcients, and ε2 is a zero mean random term. For any given J , the variation
in XJ(α) is assumed to be independent of the error terms ε1, ε2 and η. Note that, with
the usual convention that the Box-Cox transformation (Y ω − 1)/ω = lnY when ω = 0,
the dependent variable in (3) is a continuously diﬀerentiable transformation of Y . Also
note that, through the random coeﬃcient vector η, our model allows heterogeneity both
in the returns to schooling and experience.
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Even in the special case where the transformation parameters ω and α are known (or
given), one cannot estimate (3) by standard methods due to the fact that XJ(α) depends
on ε1, which may be correlated with both η and ε2. As we show in this paper, it is,
however, possible to derive a closed-form expression for the joint probability density of
the endogenous variables (Y, J), given Z1 and Z2.
Let
E(ε1ε2) = θ, E(ηkε1) = ρk. (4)
The vector of random terms (ε1, ε2, η) is assumed to be multinormally distributed with
zero mean and a general covariance matrix, apart from the conventional identifying re-
striction that ε1 has unit variance. In the following, let Φ(·) denote the standard normal
c.d.f. and φ(·) the corresponding density. We then have the following result.
Theorem 1 Let Ω be the covariance matrix of (ε2, η),
ψ(Xj(α))2 =
k
1, Xj(α)

Ω

1, Xj(α)
l
(5)
and
g(Xj(α))2 = 1− (X
j(α)ρ+ θ)2
ψ(Xj(α))2 .
If f(y, j|Z1, Z2) denotes the joint density of (Y, J) given (Z1, Z2), then
f(y, j|Z1, Z2) =
(6)
yω−1
ψ(Xj(α))φ

(yω − 1)/ω −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2
ψ(Xj(α))

×

Φ

µj − Z1γ1 − bj ((yω − 1)/ω −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2)
g(Xj(α))

−Φ

µj−1 − Z1γ1 − bj ((yω − 1)/ω −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2)
g(Xj(α))

.
(7)
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
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The Theorem shows that the joint density of (Y, J) (conditional on Z1, Z2) can be
expressed by means of the normal c.d.f. and p.d.f.. The first factor in (7) is the marginal
distribution of Y when level of schooling is considered as a fixed index ( j) — and not as the
outcome of a choice variable, J . The second factor expresses the conditional distribution
of J given Y .
Next we consider the conditional distribution of η and ε2 given (J,Z1, Z2). Using (4),
we can write
ε2 = θε1 + hε2, η = ρε1 + hη, (8)
where ρ = (ρ1, ρ2), and hε2 and hη are independent of ε1, with

hε2
hη

∼ N (0,Σ)
for a positive semidefinite 3-dimensional covariance matrix Σ.
Proposition 2 Let κ(ε2|J, Z1, Z2) and qk(ηk|J, Z1, Z2) be the conditional densities of ε2
and ηk, respectively, given (J,Z1, Z2). If (τ20, τ21, τ 22) denotes the diagonal elements of Σ,
we have
κ(ε2|J, Z1, Z2) = 1
b0
φ(ε2
b0
)hJ0(ε2)
and
qk(ηk|J, Z1, Z2) =
1
bk
φ(ηk
bk
)hJk(ηk)
where
b0 =
t
θ2 + τ20, bk =
t
ρ2k + τ 2k, k = 1, 2,
and
hJk(x) =
Φ

bk
τk
(µJ − Z1γ1 −
ρkx
b2k
)

− Φ

bk
τk
(µJ−1 − Z1γ1 −
ρkx
b2k
)

Φ (µJ − Z1γ1)− Φ

µJ−1 − Z1γ1
 , k = 0, 1, 2.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix A.
The log-likelihood function is given by
L =
N[
i=1
ln f(Yi, Ji|Z1i, Z2i), (9)
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where the index i represents individual i. The fact that one can express f(y, j|Z1, Z2)
on closed form has several important advantages. First, it becomes easy to carry out
maximum likelihood estimation and to perform statistical tests by means of the likelihood
ratio statistic. Second, by utililzing the results in Corollary 3 below, several types of
treatment eﬀects, as commonly discussed in the literature, can be estimated. Third, it
is easy to extend the model to the case where the random components (ε1, ε2, η) have a
mixed multivariate normal distribution, as show in Appendix B. This case is similar to,
but much simpler than, Carneiro et al. (2003), whose approach requires that parameters
have prior (Bayesian) distributions, and leads to simulation-based inferences.
Corollary 3 Let ξ(J) = E(ε2|J) and δk(J) = E(ηk|J). Under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 1,
δk(J) = −ρkλ(J) (10)
and
ξ(J) = −θλ(J), (11)
where
λ(J) =

φ(µJ − Z1γ1)− φ(µJ−1 − Z1γ1)

Φ(µJ − Z1γ1)− Φ(µJ−1 − Z1γ1)
. (12)
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Appendix A.
Corollary 3 is useful for calculating the eﬀects of alternative schooling choices. For
example, δk(j) yields the mean of ηk for those who have chosen J = j. When analyzing
the implications of alternative schooling choices, it is of interest to calculate (treatment)
eﬀects not only conditional on J , but also conditional on years of schooling, i.e., on
XJ1 = x1. Let ζ(x1) be the (deterministic function) that assigns the schooling level that
corresponds to x1 years of schooling, i.e., XJ1 = x1 implies J = ζ(x1). Thus, the following
holds
E(ηk|XJ1 = x1) = δk(ζ(x1)) (13)
and
E(ε2|XJ1 = x1) = ξ(ζ(x1)). (14)
Note that we can express (3) as
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(Y ω − 1)/ω = XJ(α)(β + δ(J)) + Z2γ2 + ξ(J) + ε∗,
where
ε∗ = ε2 − ξ(J) +XJ(α)(η − δ(J)),
δ(J) = (δ1(J), δ2(J)), and the error term, ε∗, has the property that E(ε∗|J) = 0. Thus,
it is possible to estimate β and γ2 by (possibly non-linear) regression, becasue the mean
of the error term given the self-selected sample is zero and estimates of δ(J) and ξ(J)
are available from (10)-(12). Specifically, a conventional ordered probit analysis based on
(1)-(2) yields estimates of µJ and γ1.
The special case with ω = 0 and with no transformation of years of schooling, and
experience expressed as a quadratic, corresponds to the standard Mincer equation that
has been used in numerous empirical studies on ”returns to schooling”. Most of the
papers explicitly addressing selection bias in returns to schooling either use instrumental
variables or a version of the two-stage method outlined above; see, for example, Card
(2000) and Vella and Verbeek (1999).
3 An empirical application
3.1 Data
The data for this application are taken from the Norwegian system of register data,
where individual information about essentially all Norwegian residents is gathered from
a number of governmental administrative registers. In addition to basic demographic
information, the system contains information about education, income and employment.
In this study, we use a 10 percent sample of all native-born males who lived in Norway in
1970, born between 1952 and 1970, and still living in Norway in 1997. The data contain
information on years of schooling and type of education for each individual. The earnings
equation sample is restricted to full-time wage-earners, defined as individuals working 30
hours or more per week, leaving us with 29,533 observations. Labor market experience
is represented in the usual way, i.e., age minus years of schooling minus seven years.
The earnings measure used is total annual taxable labor income. Because the earnings
measure reflects annual earnings, observations where employment relationships started or
terminated within the actual year were excluded. Holders of multiple jobs and individuals
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who have received labor market compensation or have participated in active labor market
programs have been excluded. Family background information is taken from the National
Census of the Population and Housing in 1970. A full list of variables with key summary
statistics is given in Table A1.
3.2 Empirical specification and estimation results
In our application the level of schooling is divided into eight groups, i.e., J ∈ {1, 2, .., 8}.
Level 1 corresponds to seven to nine years of schooling, levels 2 to 7 correspond to 10-15
years, respectively, whereas level 8 corresponds to 16-18 years of schooling. Let XJ1 denote
years of schooling exceeding seven years andXJ2 potential experience, defined as age minus
years of schooling minus sevem years. We consider three types of transformation functions
of XJk (k = 1, 2), namely
Linear: XJk (αk) = XJk
Quadratic: XJk (αk) =

(XJk + αk,1)2 − 1

/2
Generalized Box-Cox: XJk (αk) =

(XJk + αk,1)αk,2 − 1

/αk,2
Splines: XJk (αk) =
S
j αk,[j/2], αk,0 = 1,
where [x] denotes the integer value of x. The spline transformation of XJk has knots at
year one and two and every second year thereafter (4,6,8,...). Thus, because the maximum
values of XJ1 and X
J
2 in our sample is 11 (i.e., 18 years of schooling) and 29 (years of
experience), respectively, we are able to identify five α1-parameters ([11/2] = 5) and 14
α2-parameters ([29/2] = 14). Note that the linear and quadratic transformations are
special cases of the (generalized) Box-Cox transformation, obtained by setting αk,2 = 1
and αk,2 = 2, respectively.
The vector of explanatory variables in the income equation, Z2, includes indicators
about sector of occupation (public, private services, manufacturing), field of education
(general, technical, humanistic, teaching, administrative, etc.), and indicators for each of
19 counties where the individual works. The vector of explanatory variables of the ordered
probit model for schooling choice, Z1, contains variables regarding the family background.
These include dummy variables for birth cohort, indicators of whether the individual as
a child lived with both parents or alone with either mother or father, the labor market
status of the parents, indicators of household income (quintile and both the father’s and
mother’s education level), and whether the person had a mother and/or father who was
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born abroad. In addition, the schooling choice equation contains indicator variables for
the county where the individual grew up, for example, where the individual lived in 1970.
The main exclusion restriction in this application, which in addition to functional form
assumptions identifies the parameters of the model, is that given all the other covariates
in the model, the region where you grew up may aﬀect your choice of schooling, but
not your earnings. It is well documented that educational choices vary considerably
across regions in Norway. This is true also when conditioning on, for example, family
background variables. The instrument is in the spirit of Card (1995) who used college
proximity as an instrument, but may be interpreted in a more general sense as variations
in the opportunity cost of education.
The results for some key combinations of transformations of earnings, schooling and
experience are displayed in Table 1. A full set of results is reported in the Appendix C.
When interpreting the results in the table, one should bear in mind that the parameter
estimates of β1and β2 are not comparable across diﬀerent models, as they are coeﬃcients
of diﬀerent transformations of schooling and experience. Moreover, whereas the models
reported in the first three columns of Table 1 have log income, ln y, as the dependent
variable, the last column reports results from a specification with a general Box-Cox
transformation of income.
From Table 1, we first note that the linear-quadratic specification with regard to
schooling and experience, i.e., the traditional Mincer model, gives a substantially lower
log-likelihood than the Box-Cox model (Model 2) and — especially — the spline models
(models 3-4). On the other hand, when ω = 0, the spline transformations of XJ1 and
XJ2 give considerably higher likelihood than the Box-Cox transformations — but at the
cost of 15 more parameters. Although the model with spline transformations of XJ1 and
XJ2 is clearly the most flexible one with respect to parameterization, it is not a special
case of either the Box-Cox or the linear-quadratic specification. On the other hand, the
linear-quadratic specification is a special case of Box-Cox, with three parameters fewer.
Because eα2,1 = 2.49 and eα2,2 ≈ 0 (the “hat” denotes a maximum likelihood estimate), we
see that the estimated Box-Cox transformation of experience amounts to ln(XJ2 + 2.49).
With regard to the transformation of income, the general Box-Cox transformation
leads to an estimate of ω equal to -.17, with a standard error of only .003. The results
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Table 1: Parameter estimates of earnings equation for diﬀerent model specifi-
cations
Model specification
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Earnings: ln y ln y ln y (Y ω − 1) /ω
Schooling: Linear Box-Cox Splines Splines
Experience: Quadratic Box-Cox Splines Splines
ω 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) -.17 (.003)
β1 .08 (.003) .66 (.09) .06 (.005) .01 (.001)
β2 -.0005 (.0001) .21 (.01) .01 (.001) .05 (.005)
SD(ε2) .26 (.01) .51 (.10) .24 (.03) .05 (.001)
SD(η1) .01 (.004) .08 (.02) .01 (.001) .001 (.0002)
SD(η2) .0003 (.00004) .13 (.02) .01 (.001) .03 (.004)
Corr(ε2, ε1) -.12 (.05) -.34 (.06) -.25 (.05)) -.25 (.04)
Corr(η1, ε1) .03 (.24) .39 (.06) .35 (07) .47 (.16)
Corr(η1, ε2) .92 (.13) -.82 (.06) -.13 (.23) .30 (.16)
Corr(η2, ε1) -.04 (.07) -.01 (.03) -.03 (.03) .06 (.05)
Corr(η2, ε2) -.62 (.07) -.93 (.02) -.48 (.11) -.15 (.08)
Corr(η2, η1) -.87 (.17) .77 (.06) .64 (.11) -.77 (.15)
α1,1 11.26 (1.39)
α1,2 1 (-) .28 (.03)
α2,1 -29.5 (2.48) 2.49 (.62)
α2,2 2 (-) .002 (.002)
log-likelihood -27274 -27251 -27179 -27058
Sample size 29,332 29,332 29,332 29,332
suggest that ω is significantly diﬀerent from zero. However, from the point of view of
economic significance ω = −.17 is so close to zero that the Box-Cox and logarithmic
transformation are equivalent for practical purposes. We will illustrate this point below.
The estimated correlations between the stochastic terms have interesting economic
interpretations and give information on the nature of self-selection. However, the pair-
wise correlations reported in Table 1 show that many of these are not robust across
diﬀerent model specifications. For example, we find strong evidence of negative correlation
between η2 and ε2 when ω = 0, but not at the maximum likelihood estimate ω = −.17.
However, with regard to the correlations that have the clearest economic interpretation
we get quite striking results. First of all, it is evident that self-selection does matter.
Concentrating on the results from the Box-Cox and spline transformations of schooling
and experience, which overall give the best fit to the data and the most plausible results,
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there are significant negative correlations between ε1 and ε2, i.e., the residual terms of
the earnings and schooling equations. We also find strong positive correlations between
η1 and ε1. Using spline transformations of XJ1 and XJ2 , we obtain correlation coeﬃcients
of the same magnitude as for the Box-Cox transformations, regardless of whether ω = 0
or ω = −.17. The robust findings that Corr(η1, ε1) > 0 and Corr(ε1, ε2) < 0 imply,
respectively, that individuals who undertake more education than what is predicted from
the schooling equation, have high returns to schooling, and that the part of their earnings
potential that is unrelated to schooling and experience is lower. In particular, the economic
interpretation of Corr(η1, ε1) > 0 is that individuals with a high learning potential in
school also have a high learning potential on the job. It should be kept in mind, however,
that the correlations reported in Table 1 depend on the respective specifications and
cannot be interpreted independently of the chosen transformations of length of schooling
and experience.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to schooling and experience, as seen
from the estimated standard deviations SD(η1) and SD(η2) of η1 and η2, respectively,
which are of the samemagnitude as the estimated fixed coeﬃcients, eβ1 and eβ2. To evaluate
the importance of individual heterogeneity in the returns to experience and schooling, it
is natural to look at the variation coeﬃcients SD(η1)/eβ1 and SD(η2)/eβ2. These ratios lie
between 1/10 and 1 in all the model specifications and are smaller for schooling than
for experience. Thus, it seems that relative to the fixed coeﬃcient, βk, the unobserved
heterogeneity in returns to experience is larger than in returns to schooling. As a further
check of the importance of heterogeneity in the coeﬃcients of schooling and experience, a
model with only a fixed coeﬃcient vector (i.e., no η-vector) was estimated. This restriction
reduced the number of parameters by nine. However, it was firmly rejected by a likelihood
ratio tests.
In analyses of returns to schooling and experience, the marginal returns to schooling
and the earnings-experience profiles are of key interest. In models allowing for hetero-
geneity in returns, there are several possible “marginal returns” or “treatment eﬀects”
that may be calculated, based on the estimation results. Which eﬀects that are most
relevant, depend on the purpose of the analysis. In models with no heterogeneity in the
returns, all treatment eﬀects coincide.
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The diﬀerences in results across the four model specifications are illustrated in Figures
1—4, along with the results from a linear-quadratic specification without selection eﬀects
(equivalent to OLS estimation of a standard Mincer equation). Figure 1 shows expected
log earnings as a function of years of schooling when all the other variables of the earnings
equation are set equal to their sample mean. In particular, years of experience is fixed
at 15 years. The intercepts of the diﬀerent graphs in the figure are determined by the
(identifying) condition that when all the variables are at their sample means, expected
log earnings should be equal in all the four model specifications. We see that the two
versions of the model with spline transformations of schooling depicted in Figure 1, i.e.,
with ω = 0 and ω = −.17 as the dependent variables, are almost identical, except for
small discrepancies at low values of years of schooling.
Figure 2 shows the expected marginal returns to schooling corresponding to the three
specifications in Figure 1 with lnY as the dependent variable. The natural interpretation
of the estimates from the models with selection eﬀects is as the “average treatment eﬀect”
of schooling. This means that the graphs show the marginal eﬀect on earnings of the last
year of schooling, given that a randomly selected individual is given that number of
years of schooling (years of schooling is shown on the horizontal axis). In contrast, the
interpretation of the OLS estimate shows the (conditional) earnings diﬀerentials between
individuals with diﬀerent levels of schooling. In the absence of selection eﬀects, OLS and
the linear specification will coincide.
Comparing OLS with full information maximum likelihood estimation of the linear
specification, we see from Figures 1 and 2 that allowing for selection eﬀects does matter
for the estimated returns to schooling. From Figure 2 wee find a marginal returns to
schooling of around one percentage point higher when we allow for selection eﬀects. When
comparing the linear specification with the more flexible specifications, we see that there
are considerable diﬀerences in the estimated marginal returns across levels of schooling.
In particular, there are high returns to completing upper secondary school (12 years) and
to take one or two years of higher education, while the marginal return of the last year
of schooling, if the current level of schooling is 15 years or more, is considerably smaller.
Hence, allowing for a more flexible specification not only improves the fit of the model as
measured by log-likelihood, but also aﬀects the size of the key measures of interest.
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Figure 3 shows expected log earnings as a function of years of experience, with the
other variables of the earnings equation fixed at their sample means, for exampole, years of
schooling equals 12 years. In contrast to returns to schooling, allowing for selection eﬀects
only has minor implications for estimated returns to experience. We see from Figure 3
that the Box-Cox specification gives higher marginal returns for years of experience up to
four to five years compared to the other specifications.
Concentrating on our preferred specification, with spline transformations of both
schooling and experience and with log earnings, lnY , as the dependent variable in the
earnings equation, Figure 4 depicts three diﬀerent kinds of marginal returns to schooling.
The first is the average treatment eﬀect (ATE), β1∆x1(α1), that was also depicted in
Figure 2, where ∆x1(α1) is the change in the spline transformation of schooling, x1(α1),
when years of schooling increases from x1 − 1 to x1. The second is the “eﬀect of the
treatment on the treated” (TT), (β1 + δ1(ζ(x1 − 1)) )∆x1(α), cf. (13), which has the
interpretation of the marginal return by increasing years of schooling from x1 − 1 to x1
for those who did in fact undertake the investment. The final is the observed diﬀeren-
tials between levels of schooling (OD): (β1 + δ1(ζ(x1 − 1))) ∆x1(α) + ∆ξ(ζ(x1)), where
∆ξ(ζ(x1)) ≡ ξ(ζ(x1))−ξ(ζ(x1−1)), cf. (14). This is the sum of (i) the average treatment
eﬀect, (ii) the average of the idiosyncratic marginal returns to schooling for the individ-
uals with this level of schooling and (iii) the average idiosyncratic earnings level eﬀect
for the same individuals. We see that TT in general is higher than ATE. This reflects
the positive correlation between ε2 and η1 that was reported in Table 1: Individuals with
higher idiosyncratic return to a level of schooling also invest more in schooling. Hence
the marginal returns at a specific level are higher for those who actually have this level
of schooling than for the average individual. In other words, there is selection by com-
parative advantage. On the other hand, we also estimated a negative correlation between
ε1 and ε2; conditional on idiosyncratic returns to schooling, those with higher earnings
potential regardless of schooling tend to choose a lower level of schooling. This is clearly
seen from the earnings-schooling profiles in Figure 1. The self-selection related to ε2 gives
a flatter profile, i.e., individuals with high ε2 tend to have low levels of schooling and vice
versa.
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Figure 4: Estimates of treatment eﬀects
To evaluate the fit of our preferred specification, Figure 5 plots (i) the discrete prob-
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ability density functions over a grid of 100 intervals, with equal length, for the estimated
spline model with log earnings, lnY , as the dependent variable, and (ii) histograms of the
log earnings data. This is done conditional on the chosen level of schooling, i.e., for eight
diﬀerent levels. Note that the estimated theoretical models are not normal distributions.
They are derived from (7), by integrating out (Z1, Z2) using the empirical distribution
function of these covariates. In fact, the estimated conditional probability density func-
tions are slightly skewed to the right, although this is barely visible in the figure. A
QQ-plot of the marginal distribution of log-earnings is presented in Figure 6. The overall
impression from these figures is that the estimated model fits the data well.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed maximum likelihood estimation of a joint model for earn-
ings and choice of level of schooling. The earnings relation is allowed to be very general
with random coeﬃcients and possibly particular families of nonlinear transformations of
the independent and dependent variables. The choice model for length of schooling is
an ordered Probit model. The random coeﬃcients and the additive error terms in the
earnings relation and the choice model are assumed distributed according to the multi-
normal distribution. This means that all the random terms in the model are allowed to
be correlated. Under these assumptions we have demonstrated that the joint distribution
of the choice of level of schooling and earnings can be expressed on closed form. We have
also outlined how this model can be extended to the case where the joint distribution of
the random terms is a discrete (multinomial) mixture of the multinormal distribution.
We have applied this framework and methodology to analyze the structure of the earn-
ings relation on microdata for Norway. The estimation results show that if we constrain
the transformation of the dependent variable to be of the Box-Cox type, the logarithm
of earnings seems to be the best one in terms of fit. Within the class of Box-Cox trans-
formations, or alternatively spline transformations of the independent variables “years of
schooling” and “potential experience”, the latter family turns out to give the best fit.
We believe that the econometric framework developed in this paper oﬀers several ad-
vantages to the researcher compared to the two-stage control function approach. Because
it is a maximum likelihood approach it allows for nonlinear transformations of the depen-
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dent variable that contain unknown parameters. Second, biases due to heteroscedasticity
and imputed estimates from the first stage that typically plague the control function ap-
proach no longer exist. Third, the maximum likelihood approach facilitates testing of
alternative specifications within our framework.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1, Proposition 2 and
Corollary 3
Purri ri Tkhruhp 1.
Define
εj3 = Xj(α)η + ε2. (15)
Then we can write
ε1 = bjεj3 + hεj3, (16)
for a suitable fixed coeﬃcient bj, where and hεj3 is normally distributed with zero mean
and independent of εj3. From (15) and (5) it follows that
V ar(εj3) = ψ(Xj(α))2. (17)
By multiplying (16) by εj3 and taking expectation on both sides we obtain that bj is
determined by
E(ε1εj3) = E(bjε2j3) + E(hεj3εj3)
p
(Xj(α)ρ+ θ) = bjψ(Xj(α))2, (18)
where we have used (4), (15) and (17). Moreover, (16) and (17) imply that
1 = b2jψ(Xj(α))2 + V ar(hεj3) (19)
When bj, determined by (18), is inserted into (19), we obtain
V ar(hεj3) ≡ g(Xj(α))2 = 1−
(XJ(α)ρ+ θ)2
ψ(Xj(α))2 . (20)
Now consider the choice of level of schooling. From (1)-(2) and (16),
J = j ⇔ µj−1 − Z1γ1 − bjεj3 < hεj3 ≤ µj − Z1γ1 − bjεj3. (21)
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From (3),
εj3 = Y [ω] −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2. (22)
where Y [ω] = (Y ω − 1)/ω. Hence,
P (Y [ω] ∈ (z, z + dz), J = j|Z1, Z2) =
P (Y [ω] ∈ (z, z + dz), µj−1 − Z1γ1 − bjεj3 < hεj3 ≤ µj − Z1γ1 − bjεj3) =
P

εj3 ∈

z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2, z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2 + dz

, µj−1 − Z1γ1
−bj

z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2

< hεj3 ≤ µj − Z1γ1 − bj

z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2

.
(23)
Because hεj3 and εj3 are independent, using (17), (20), (7), the last expression above
is equal to
P (εj3 ∈ (z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2, z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2 + dz)×
P

µj−1 − Z1γ1 − bj

z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2

< hεj3 ≤ µj − Z1γ1
−bj

z −XJ(α)β + Z2γ2

=
dz
ψ(Xj(α))
φ

z −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2
ψ(Xj(α))


Φ

µj − Z1γ1 − bj (z −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2)
g(Xj(α))

−Φ

µj−1 − Z1γ1 − bj (z −Xj(α)β − Z2γ2)
g(Xj(α))

.
Now, because z = (yω− 1)/ω and dz = yω−1dy, the density in terms of untransformed
earnings, y, becomes equal to (7). This completes the proof.
Purri ri Pursrvlwlrq 2.
From (8) we have, for k = 1, 2,
qk(ηk|j, Z1, Z2) =
U µj−Z1γ1
µj−1−Z1γ1
1
τk
φ(ηk−ρkε1τk )φ(ε1) dε1
P (J = j)
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Because
φ(ηk − ρkε1τ k
)φ(ε1) = φ(
ηk
bk
)φ

bk
τk
(ε1 −
ρkηk
b2k
)

,
with
bk =
t
ρ2k + τ2k,
and
] µj−Z1γ1
µj−1−Z1γ1
φ

bk
τk
(ε1 −
ρkηk
b2k
)

dε1
=
τk
bk

Φ

bk
τk
(µj − Z1γ1 −
ρkηk
b2k
)

− Φ

bk
τ k
(µj−1 − Z1γ1 −
ρkηk
b2k
)

,
we obtain
qk(ηk|j, Z1, Z2) =
1
bk
φ(ηk
bk
)hjk(ηk).
Notice that 1
bk
φ(ηk
bk
) is the unconditional distribution of ηk. When ρk = 0, the correction
factor hjk(x) = 1. The result for κ(ε2|j, Z1, Z2) follows similarly.
Purri ri Cruroodu| 3.
From (8), (12) and the independence of ε1 and hη it follows that
δ(j) = E(η|J = j) = E(ρε1 + hη|J = j) = E(ρε1|J = j)
= ρE(ε1|µj−1 − Z1γ1 < ε1 ≤ µj − Z1γ1) = ρ
U µj−Z1γ1
µj−1−Z1γ1
uφ(u) du
P (J = j)
= −ρ

φ(µj − Z1γ1)− φ(µj−1 − Z1γ1)

Φ(µj − Z1γ1)− Φ(µj−1 − Z1γ1)
= −ρλj . (24)
Similarly, we obtain
ξ(j) = E(ε2|J = j) = E(θε1 + hε2|J = j)
= θE(ε1|J = j) = −θλj. (25)
Appendix B: Extension to mixture distributions of the
random components
Similarly to Carneiro et al. (2003) we shall now consider the case where the joint distribu-
tion of the random components is a discrete mixture of multinormal distributions. To this
end we extend the previous notation of the random error terms to (ε1(R), ε2(R), η(R)),
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where R denotes a random index that is multinomially distributed with P (R = r) = pr,
r = 1, 2, . . . , Q. The vectors (ε1(r), ε2(r), η(r)), r = 1, 2, . . . , Q, are independent and
multinormally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix Ω(r). With this exten-
sion, our model becomes a (non-Bayesian) version of the model estimated in Carneiro et
al. (2003) (see Section 7 and Appendix B in their paper). Their model is more general
in the sense that they have several measurement and outcome equations in addition to
the schooling choice equation, whereas we only have one outcome equation, namely the
earnings equation. Now let f(y, j|R,Z1, Z2) denote the conditional density of earnings,
Y , and chosen schooling level, J , given (R,Z1, Z2). This density is expressed in (7), apart
from the modification that the parameters of the covariance matrix Ω(r), are now indexed
by r, i.e., θ(r), ρ(r),Ω(r). Consequently, the joint density of (Y, J) can be expressed as
f(y, j|Z1, Z2) =
Q[
r=1
prf(y, j|r, Z1, Z2)
Thus, the likelihood function can be expressed on closed form also in the case when
the joint distribution of the random components is a discrete mixture of multinormal
distributions.
Appendix C: Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for schooling, experience and earnings
Variable Mean St.dev. Min Max
Years of schooling 12.2 2.3 7 18.0
Years of experience 15.2 5.9 0 29.0
Log of earnings 7.7 0.3 6.4 9.8
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for Z1 with corresponding parameter estimates
Z1-variables Mean St.dev Min Max Parameter S.E.
estimate
Lone mother 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.27 0.07
Lone father 0.01 0.08 0 1 -0.05 0.08
No parents 0.01 0.09 0 1 -0.13 0.07
Mother working 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.02 0.01
Father working 0.93 0.25 0 1 0.07 0.04
Family income:
quintile 2 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.09 0.02
quintile 3 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.15 0.02
quintile 4 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.23 0.02
quintile 5 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.32 0.03
Mother’s schooling:
lower secondary 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.35 0.02
upper secondary 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.45 0.03
lower tertiary 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.71 0.04
upper teritary 0.00 0.06 0 1 0.88 0.13
Father’s schooling:
lower secondary 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.31 0.02
upper secondary 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.39 0.02
lower tertiary 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.69 0.03
upper teritary 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.99 0.04
Born abroad 0.00 0.02 0 1 -0.31 0.27
Father born abroad 0.06 0.24 0 1 -0.08 0.05
Mother born abroad 0.03 0.16 0 1 -0.08 0.04
Østfold 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.03 0.03
Akershus 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.04 0.03
Hedmark 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.07 0.04
Oppland 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.14 0.04
Buskerud 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.03
Vestfold 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.09 0.04
Telemark 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.14 0.04
A-Agder 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.24 0.05
V-Agder 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.22 0.04
Rogaland 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.11 0.03
Hordaland 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.20 0.03
Sogn Fj. 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.36 0.04
Møre Roms. 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.26 0.03
S-Tr 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.21 0.03
N-Tr 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.42 0.04
Nordland 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.34 0.03
Troms 0.03 0.18 0 1 0.24 0.04
Finnmark 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.27 0.05
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Z2 with corresponding parameter estimates
Z2-variables Mean St.dev. Min Max Parameter S.E.
estimate
Intercept 7.33 0.04
Manufacturing 0 -
Public services 0.28 0.45 0 1 -0.20 0.03
Private services 0.40 0.49 0 1 -0.04 0.03
Unspecified 0.00 0.04 0 1 -0.23 0.04
General 0.19 0.40 0 1 0.05 0.03
Humanities 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.10 0.04
Teaching 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.14 0.05
Technical 0 -
Business/administrative 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.02 0.02
Transport 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.01
Health 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.07 0.00
Farming/fisheries 0.02 0.13 0 1 -0.06 0.05
Services/military 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.08 0.01
Østfold 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.15 0.01
Akershus 0.09 0.28 0 1 -0.03 0.01
Oslo 0 -
Hedmark 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.19 0.00
Oppland 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.22 0.01
Buskerud 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.11 0.01
Vestfold 0.04 0.19 0 1 -0.14 0.01
Telemark 0.03 0.17 0 1 -0.13 0.01
A-Agder 0.02 0.13 0 1 -0.18 0.01
V-Agder 0.03 0.17 0 1 -0.14 0.01
Rogaland 0.08 0.27 0 1 -0.02 0.01
Hordaland 0.09 0.29 0 1 -0.11 0.01
Sogn Fj. 0.02 0.15 0 1 -0.18 0.01
Møre Roms. 0.05 0.22 0 1 -0.16 0.01
S-Tr 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.18 0.01
N-Tr 0.02 0.15 0 1 -0.23 0.01
Nordland 0.05 0.21 0 1 -0.20 0.01
Tromsø 0.03 0.18 0 1 -0.16 0.01
Finnmark 0.02 0.12 0 1 -0.21 0.01
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